Zeeshan — How to Get Out of Iraq
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THE NATION
How to Get Out of Iraq
by VARIOUS CONTRIBUTORS
[from the May 24, 2004 issue]
As the situation in Iraq goes from bad to worse, many
Americans who opposed the war, including Nation
editors and writers, understand that the country must
find a way to extricate itself from the disaster they
predicted. There is, however, no agreement or even
clarity about such an exit strategy. Nor is any
leadership on this crucial issue coming from the Bush
Administration or as yet, alas, from the presumptive
Democratic candidate, Senator John Kerry. With a sense
of obligation and urgency, The Nation, has asked a
range of writers, both regular and new contributors to
the magazine, for their ideas on America’s way out of
Iraq. Some responded with short essays, while others
were interviewed by contributing writer Scott Sherman,
who transcribed and edited their remarks. We hope that
what follows is the beginning toward a necessary end.
And we invite readers to respond; we will publish an
exchange in an upcoming issue. –The Editors
Jonathan Schell
In the debate over the Iraq war, a new-minted fragment
of conventional wisdom has fixed itself in the minds
of mainstream politicians and commentators. Whether or
not it was right to go to war, we are told on all
sides, the United States must now succeed in achieving
its aims. In the words of John Kerry, “Americans
differ about whether and how we should have gone to
war, but it would be unthinkable now for us to retreat
in disarray and leave behind a society deep in strife
and dominated by radicals.” Or as Senator Richard
Lugar has said, “We are in Iraq and so we’re going to
have to bring stability.” Or, as Senator Joseph Biden,
among so many others, has said, as if to put an end to
all discussion, “Failure is not an option.”
The argument is an irritating one for those of us who
opposed the war, suggesting, as it does, that we must
now sign up for the project (“stay the course”)
because the very mistake we warned against was made.
But the problems are more serious than annoyance. Of
course, no one wants to see anarchy or repression in
Iraq or any other country. But what can it mean to say
that failure is not an option? Has the decision to go
to war exhausted our powers of thought and will? Must
we surrender now to fate? “Failure” is in truth never
an “option.” The exercise of an option is a voluntary
act; but failure is forced upon you by events. It is
what happens when your options run out. To rule out
failure is not a policy but a wish–and a wish,
indeed, for omnipotence. Yet no one, not even the
world’s sole superpower, is omnipotent. To imagine
otherwise is to set yourself up for a fall even bigger
than the failure you imagine you are ruling out.
And so decisions must still be made. It’s true that we
opponents of the war cannot simply say (as we might
like to do), “Please roll history back to March of
2003, and make your disastrous war unhappen.” It’s
also true that when the United States overthrew the
Iraqi government it took on new responsibilities. The
strongest argument for staying in Iraq is that the
United States, having taken over the country, owes its
people a better future. But acknowledgment of such a
responsibility is only the beginning, not the end, of
an argument.
To meet a responsibility to someone, you must have
something on offer that they want. Certainly, the
people of Iraq want electricity, running water and
other material assistance. The United States should
supply it. Perhaps–it’s hard to find out–they also
want democracy. But democracy cannot be shipped to
Iraq on a tanker or a C-5A. It is a homegrown
construct, which must flow from the will of the people
involved. The expression of that will is, in fact,
what democracy is.
But today the United States seeks to impose a
government on Iraq in the teeth of an increasingly
powerful popular opposition. The result of this policy
can be seen in the shameful attacks from the air on
the cordoned-off city of Falluja, causing hundreds of
casualties. The more the United States tries to force
what it insists on calling democracy on Iraq, the more
the people of Iraq will hate the United States, and
even, perhaps, the name of democracy. There is no
definition of an obligation that includes attacking
the supposed beneficiaries’ cities with F-16s and
AC-130 gunships.
President Bush commented recently of the Iraqis, “It’s
going to take a while for them to understand what
freedom is all about.” Hachim Hassani, a
representative of the Iraqi Islamic Party, a leading
Sunni Muslim group represented on the so-called
Governing Council, might have been answering him when
he commented to the Los Angeles Times, “The Iraqi
people now equate democracy with bloodshed.”
Under these circumstances, staying the course cannot
benefit Iraq. On the contrary, each additional day
that American troops continue to fight in Iraq can
only compound the eventual price of the original
mistake–costing more lives, American and Iraqi,
disorganizing and pulverizing the society, and
reducing, not fostering, any chances for a better
future for the country.
There are still many things that the United States can
do for the people of Iraq. Continued economic
assistance is one. Another is to help international
organizations assist (but only to whatever degree is
wanted by the local people) in the transition to a new
political order. But all combat operations should
cease immediately and then, on a fixed and announced
timetable, the American forces should withdraw from
the country. In short, the United States, working with
others, should give Iraqis their best chance to
succeed in their own efforts to create their own
future.
According to the most recent Times/CBS poll, the
public, by a margin of 48 percent to 46 percent, has
decided, with no encouragement from either of the two
major-party presidential candidates or from most media
commentators, that the war was a mistake. Forty-six
percent have decided that the American troops should
be withdrawn. They are right. The United States should
never have invaded Iraq. Now it should leave.
——————————————————————————–
The Harold Willens Peace Fellow at The Nation
Institute, he is the author, most recently, of The
Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will
of the People (Metropolitan).
Howard Zinn
Any “practical” approach to the situation in Iraq, any
prescription for what to do now, must start with the
understanding that the present US military occupation
is morally unacceptable. Amnesty International, a year
after the invasion, reported: “Scores of unarmed
people have been killed due to excessive or
unnecessary use of lethal force by coalition forces
during public demonstrations, at checkpoints and in
house raids. Thousands of people have been detained
[estimates range from 8,500 to 15,000, often under
harsh conditions] and subjected to prolonged and often
unacknowledged detention. Many have been tortured or
ill-treated and some have died in custody.” The
prospect, if the occupation continues, whether by the
United States or by an international force (as John
Kerry seems to be proposing), is of continued
suffering and death for both Iraqis and Americans.
The history of military occupations of Third World
countries is that they bring neither democracy nor
security. The laments that “we mustn’t cut and run,”
“we must stay the course,” our “reputation” will be
imperiled, etc., are exactly what we heard when at the
start of the Vietnam escalation some of us called for
immediate withdrawal. The result of staying the course
was 58,000 Americans and several million Vietnamese
dead.
The only rational argument for continuing on the
present course is that things will be worse if we
leave. In Vietnam, they promised a bloodbath if we
left. That did not happen. It was said that if we did
not drop the bomb on Hiroshima, we would have to
invade Japan and huge casualties would follow. We know
now and knew then that this was not true. The truth
is, no one knows what will happen if the United States
withdraws. We face a choice between the certainty of
mayhem if we stay, and the uncertainty of what will
follow if we leave.
What would be a reasonably good scenario to accompany
our departure? The UN should arrange, as US forces
leave, for an international group of peacekeepers and
negotiators from the Arab countries to bring together
Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds, and work out a solution for
self-governance that would give all three groups a
share in political power. Simultaneously, the UN
should arrange for shipments of food and medicine,
from the United States and other countries, as well as
engineers to help rebuild the country.
The one thing to be avoided is for the United States,
which destroyed Iraq and caused perhaps a million
deaths through two invasions and ten years of
sanctions, to play any leading role in the future of
that country. In that case, terrorism would surely
flourish. It is for the United States to withdraw from
Iraq. It is for the international community,
particularly the Arab world, to try to reconstruct a
nation at peace. That gives the Iraqi people a chance.
Continued US occupation gives them no chance.
——————————————————————————–
Author, in 1967, of Vietnam: The Logic of Withdrawal,
and, later, A People’s History of the United States.
William R. Polk
Lakhdar Brahimi’s proposals are interesting, perhaps
even hopeful, but they pose almost as many problems as
they address. The Shiites are worried that he is
attempting to undercut their claims on power, and
after the siege of Falluja the Sunnis will probably
worry that he is, inadvertently or not, acting as a
cover for American attempts to hang on to control.
They have reason to worry.
The world press has reported that very little real
authority will be handed over to the Iraqis or the
United Nations. If the UN is to be of any value in
pacifying Iraq, it cannot simply be used by the United
States as a fig leaf. It must show Iraqis that it is
truly independent, and so a worthwhile step forward
for them. For all that, some form of UN trusteeship
appears to be the best answer now available. It seems
to me that the best form of trusteeship is minimal,
not much more than attempting to keep order. Anything
more will certainly raise fears in Iraq that
outsiders–the United States or the UN–really intend
to stay. That will create the only unity there now is
in Iraq, hostility to foreigners.
——————————————————————————–
Responsible for planning Middle Eastern policy at the
State Department, 1961-65 and then a University of
Chicago professor of history. His books include The
United States and the Arab World and The Elusive
Peace.
John Brady Kiesling
President Bush promised the Iraqi people and the
international community that our military victory
would make Iraq a peaceful, democratic state, a model
for its neighbors and a bastion against terrorism. If
this was our war aim, our victory did not achieve it.
The resistance movement has pinned down our soldiers
and contractors as enemy occupiers. If our troops pull
out, there will be civil war among a dozen rival
factions. If our troops stay, in redoubled numbers to
suppress the violence, their hulking presence will
doom each future Iraqi government to illegitimacy and
failure. So let us consider the alternatives to
victory.
In the end a fractured Iraq can be held together only
by a man wrapped, like George Washington or Ho Chi
Minh, in the legitimacy that derives from successful
armed struggle. We should note the ease with which a
scruffy young cleric united Sunnis and Shiites against
the US presence. A victorious Secretary Rumsfeld could
not impose Ahmad Chalabi. However, a retreating US
military can designate Iraq’s liberator. We must
select the competent Iraqi patriot to whom we yield
ground while bleeding his competitors. There will be
casualties and disorder, no matter how brilliantly we
orchestrate our withdrawal. But the overwhelming
majority of Iraqis will rally around any man who
claims to drive us out, and elections would validate
his relatively bloodless victory.
The man on a white horse can bring the UN back as
invited guests rather than as our despised surrogates.
His police will enforce the law, when ours cannot. His
debts will be forgiven, when ours would not. America
must swallow its resentment and keep a measure of
control by doling out the money to keep the Iraqi
state functional. Ten billion dollars a year will buy
more counterterrorism cooperation than a military
occupation that costs five times as much. And we will
let the Iraqis do the work. The most virtuous
Halliburton employee is ten times more expensive than
the most corrupt Iraqi. Democracy and human rights may
take a generation, but our defeat will convince a
resentful and fatalistic Middle East that change is
possible.
The Kurds, admittedly, will resist any weakness in
their US ally. Our parting gift to them will be the
southern border for an autonomous Kurdish entity. The
price will be US cooperation with Turkey to extort a
semblance of respect for the Iraqi central government
and the rights of Arab and Turkmen minorities.
We were defeated once, in Vietnam, and the dominoes
did not fall. We remained the leader of the free
world, sadder but wiser. The ignorance and megalomania
that brought us into Iraq are far more dangerous to US
security and prosperity than would be the symbolic
military defeat that gets us out.
——————————————————————————–
A career diplomat who served in US embassies in Tel
Aviv, Casablanca, Athens and Yerevan. In February 2003
he resigned from the Foreign Service in protest
against Bush Administration foreign policy.
Anne-Marie Slaughter
The United States faces two critical issues in Iraq.
First is the necessity of genuinely engaging the
international community in stabilizing the security
situation, supporting the new Iraqi government after
June 30 and rebuilding the country’s infrastructure
and economy. Crucially, this does not mean simply
brokering a face-saving resolution and handing off to
the UN, only to blame the UN later when Iraq slides
into chaos or worse. On the contrary, it means clearly
defining a UN mandate, to be supported by NATO and
other regional organizations, and then committing the
human and material resources necessary to carry out
that mandate. Handing off to the UN without such
support is an abdication of responsibility and an
admission of failure.
Second is accepting that a genuine democracy in Iraq
will bring a genuine majority to power. The way to
protect minorities in a democratic Iraq is through
federalist provisions and explicit guarantees of
minority rights. In principle, even a Shiite theocracy
can abide by such guarantees. The United States has
proclaimed the principles of democracy and
self-determination and must now abide by whatever
results are consistent with the protection of basic
international human rights.
——————————————————————————–
Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, Princeton University.
Noam Chomsky
Occupying armies have responsibilities, not rights.
Their primary responsibility is to withdraw as quickly
and expeditiously as possible, in a manner determined
by the occupied population. It follows that the orders
issued by proconsul Bremer are illegitimate and should
be rescinded, including those designed to place the
economy effectively in the hands of Western (mostly
US) banks and MNCs, and the 15 percent flat tax,
which, apart from its injustice, bars the way to
desperately needed social spending and reconstruction.
Without economic sovereignty, prospects for healthy
development are slight and political independence
verges on formality.
It also follows that Washington should end the
machinations to insure its long-term military presence
and control of Iraqi security forces, in defiance of
the will of Iraqis, who call for Iraqis to control
security, according to Western-run polls, which record
only minuscule support for the occupying military
forces and their civil counterparts (the CPA) or the
US-appointed Governing Council. With a decision,
however reluctant, to transfer authentic sovereignty
to Iraqis–not just the traditional facade for Great
Power domination–there will be no justification for
the huge diplomatic mission, apparently the world’s
largest, announced by the occupiers.
Such steps entail abandonment of plans to establish
the first secure military bases in a client state at
the heart of the world’s major energy reserves, a
powerful lever of world control, as has been
understood for sixty years, and a means to subordinate
the region more fully to US interests–and the prime
motive for the invasion, according to Western polls in
Baghdad, though some agreed with articulate Western
opinion that the goal was to establish democracy (1
percent) or to help Iraqis (5 percent).
A large majority of Americans believe that the UN, not
the United States, should take the lead in working
with Iraqis to transfer authentic sovereignty as well
as in economic reconstruction and maintaining civic
order. That is a sensible stand if Iraqis agree, as
seems likely, though the General Assembly, less
directly controlled by the invaders, is preferable to
the Security Council as the responsible transitional
authority. Reconstruction should be in the hands of
Iraqis, not delayed as a means of controlling them, as
Washington has indicated. Reparations–not just
aid–should be provided by those responsible for
devastating Iraqi civilian society by cruel sanctions
and military actions; and–together with other
criminal states–for supporting Saddam Hussein through
his worst atrocities and beyond. That is the minimum
that honesty requires.
——————————————————————————–
His most recent books are A New Generation Draws the
Line; New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind;
9-11; Understanding Power; On Nature and Language; The
Faculty of Language: What Is It, Who Has It, and How
Did It Evolve?; Chomsky on Democracy and Education;
Middle East Illusions; and Hegemony or Survival.
Stephen F. Cohen
For the sake of American lives, values and real
security, as well as peace and stability in the
increasingly explosive Middle East, the United States
must find a way to withdraw its military forces from
Iraq as soon as possible. And do so with some vestige
of, yes, honor–not for the bogus reason of
international “credibility” but to prevent a malignant
who-lost-Iraq politics in our own country.
The only near-term and honorable way out is by linking
a firm US commitment to a phased military withdrawal
to an Iraqi popular election for a representative
national assembly that would itself, not the
occupation authorities or its appointees, choose an
interim government, adopt a constitution for the
country and then schedule elections for the new
permanent institutions of government.
For Iraqis, only such a directly elected assembly can
have legitimacy and thus the “sovereignty” that the
Bush Administration is desperately trying to
manufacture and “transfer.” Do not mistake this
approach for the Administration’s afterthought of
“building democracy in Iraq,” which would mean
resolving all that tormented country’s internal
conflicts, and for which America utterly lacks both
the power and wisdom even to attempt. It means instead
giving the Iraqis an opportunity to do it themselves.
(Whether or not they can is their destiny, not ours.)
Considering the devastating consequences of an
unnecessary American war, providing such a democratic
opportunity is both the least and most we can now do.
And having done so, the United States can declare,
paraphrasing sage but ignored advice given during the
Vietnam War, “Mission accomplished. We’re going home.”
For this democratic exit to work, the United States
must, as the otherwise vacuous refrain goes, “stay the
course,” but a course based on four promises that must
be kept. American-led occupation authorities will
permit free and fair elections to the national
assembly, within the next six to nine months, under
the auspices of the UN or another international body.
They will accept the electoral outcome even if it is
an anti-American majority. Meanwhile, the United
States will prepare Iraqi security forces but begin
its military withdrawal once the interim government is
functioning. And Washington will continue to provide
funds for the reconstruction of Iraq as long as the
new Iraqi authorities generally abide by their
democratic origins.
We must flatly dismiss American proponents of a
permanent US garrison in Iraq–for the sake of oil,
Israel, some “anti-totalitarian” crusade, or
empire–but there still may be three objections to
this relatively quick and honorable exit strategy. One
is that the American occupation should not end until
there is stability in Iraq, because the consequences
will be chaos and violence. But this admonition
ignores the historical lessons of occupations
elsewhere and of the current situation in Iraq: There
can be no stability until foreign occupation ends, as
is clear from the chaos and violence unfolding today.
The second objection is that anti-American
“extremists” will disrupt the election for the
national assembly. But if such Iraqis really want
America gone, they will support an electoral process
that leads to a US withdrawal.
The third objection may be heartfelt: We did not go to
war, and lose lives, to risk the advent of another
anti-American regime in Baghdad. Yes, the Bush
Administration went to war to eliminate Iraq’s weapons
of mass destruction, and when there were none, it said
the war was really about democracy. Now this
afterthought, whatever the political (or economic)
outcome, is the only way out and our last chance to be
remembered as liberators. The alternative is
indefinite colonial-style rule, growing and
increasingly violent Iraqi resistance, and an
ever-more brutal and self-corrupting American
occupation–and eventually an even more anti-American
regime that will come to power by means other than the
ballot box.
——————————————————————————–
A professor of Russian studies and history at New York
University. His latest book is Failed Crusade: America
and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia.
Ray Close
The first thing we have to adjust to is the reality
that nationalism is the most significant force in Iraq
today. It is replacing the genuine feelings of
gratitude that many Iraqis had toward the United
States immediately following their liberation. We have
always had a set of objectives–based on neocon
ideology, not Iraqi hopes–which are unattainable
because they offend the spirit of Iraqi nationalism.
One, we want long-term strategic military bases. Two,
we count on retaining significant influence over Iraqi
oil policy. Three, we favor unrestricted foreign
investment in a country that has a history of intense
hostility toward alien ownership of the country’s
economic enterprises and natural resources. Four, we
expect Iraq to support America’s role in the Middle
East peace process even when it would mean aligning
Iraqi policy with that of George W. Bush and Ariel
Sharon. Failure to achieve those four objectives will
appear to both Republicans and Democrats to be a
failure of Bush’s overall Iraq policy. But the
Administration has already boxed itself in to the
point where there is no way it can modify those
objectives to meet reality.
There has to be regime change in Washington. It’s the
only way to solve the Iraq problem.
——————————————————————————–
Former CIA station chief in Saudi Arabia, he served
for twenty-seven years as an “Arabist” for the agency.
Phyllis Bennis
One year after President Bush’s announcement of the
end of “major combat operations” in Iraq, Washington’s
drive to empire faces new and serious challenges. One
year to the day after US military forces famously
pulled down the statue of Saddam Hussein, the front
page of the Washington Post featured a photograph of a
US soldier pulling down another potent symbol–this
one a poster of Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr–from a
pillar in the same Baghdad square.
The US-led occupation of Iraq is failing, and ending
the Bush Administration’s disaster can only begin with
ending that occupation–not with a nominal “transfer
of power” that leaves 130,000 US troops still
occupying Iraq, but with an actual end to the
occupation. Unlike in Vietnam, the constant barrage of
“we’re building democracy in Iraq” rhetoric may have
made it impossible for Bush to “declare victory and
get out.” Instead, ending the occupation will likely
mean admitting that the war was wrong, that “staying
the course” is only making things worse and that
hundreds of young American and coalition soldiers as
well as thousands of Iraqi civilians are paying an
unacceptable price.
The end of the US occupation will not alone, however,
mean the end to Iraq’s crisis. Devastated after years
of crippling economic sanctions, internal repression
and US assaults that destroyed its governing capacity,
Iraq will require significant international help. But
only after full US withdrawal can serious thought be
given to how the global community might–indeed
must–support Iraq’s post-occupation efforts to
reclaim its sovereignty.
The withdrawal and the dissolution of the US-imposed
“Governing Council” will make possible the entry into
Iraq of an international team, led by the United
Nations and backed by the key regional alliances–the
Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic
Conference–to provide protection and support.
Accountable to whatever Iraqi authority emerges after
the occupation ends, that team should be made up
primarily of technocratic experts–in elections, in
development, in economic planning, etc.–and only
secondarily include a military self-defense and
security component.
Most Iraqi military resistance is aimed directly at
the occupation; an international assistance mission
that does not control Iraqi territory, does not impose
laws on Iraq, does not hand Iraqi assets over to
corporate profiteers and does not claim Iraq’s oil as
its own will almost certainly be welcomed by a
majority of the Iraqi people. UN credibility will be
severely diminished if, with or without a new Security
Council resolution, the organization sends personnel,
funds or other assistance to Iraq to bolster,
legitimize or “internationalize” the US occupation.
Only after the US occupation ends will UN involvement
in Iraq reflect its international legitimacy.
——————————————————————————–
Fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies and author
of Calling the Shots: How Washington Dominates Today’s
UN.
Mansour Farhang
Iran and the United States both have competing
ambitions and common concerns in Iraq. Tehran favors
popular sovereignty, political equality and majority
rule in Iraq, the exact opposite of its own governing
system. This emanates from the fact that the Shiites
of Iraq, the Iranian theocrats’ co-religionists,
constitute 60 percent of Iraq’s population. The Bush
Administration, in contrast, advocates democracy in
abstraction but fears majority rule in practice. What
favors Iran in this competition is the fact that only
the Shiite clerics possess the capacity for mass
mobilization in Iraq. During the terror of Saddam
Hussein, more than 200,000 Iraqi Shiites took refuge
in Iran. Today most Iraqi Shiites are grateful to
Iranians and perceive them as allies. Washington is
aware of this sentiment and wants Iran to use its
influence to contain the radical anti-occupation
elements in the Shiite communities.
Iran’s fears are another story. The Iranian
authorities, like most people in the region, are
convinced that Ariel Sharon and his neoconservative
allies in Washington want to ignite a civil war
between the Shiites and Sunnis of Iraq, with the Kurds
remaining on the sidelines. Such a war would likely
engulf almost the entire region. Iran would back the
Shiites, while Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Arab
states of the Persian Gulf would aid the Sunnis. Al
Qaeda and the pro-Saddam Baathists, like the Likud
government in Israel, view such a conflict as an
advantage for their competing objectives. Iran’s
reigning mullahs are convinced that the United States
has nothing to gain and much to lose from such a
conflict, but they believe the Bush Administration can
be manipulated to pave the way for it.
The key to preventing this calamity is for the United
States and Iran to start negotiating their differences
and support a UN initiative to establish a federal
system consisting of autonomous entities for the
Shiites, the Kurds and the Sunnis. Iran’s theocrats
have used their confrontation with the United States
to create crises for the purpose of justifying cruel
treatment of their democratic opponents. Normalization
of US-Iran relations can contribute to both the goal
of peace in Iraq and the cause of democracy in Iran.
——————————————————————————–
Professor of politics, Bennington College.
Sherle R. Schwenninger
The most commonly proposed Democratic alternative to
the Administration’s policy in Iraq–turning over
political authority to the United Nations and getting
more countries to provide more troops and money–is
well intentioned but lacks seriousness, for two
reasons.
First, it is not realistic to expect the UN to assume
such responsibility without more resources, without
assurances from the United States about security and
without some control over the conduct of American
military strategy. Likewise, it is not realistic to
expect countries like Egypt, France, Germany, Russia,
India and Pakistan, which opposed the war, to now
commit substantial troops to Iraq in the middle of a
major insurgency, especially without a larger shift in
US policy. For both domestic and international
reasons, these countries do not want to be seen as
instruments of what they consider to be a misguided
American policy toward the Middle East in general.
Second, the Democratic alternative does not go far
enough to change the political dynamic from one of
occupation (albeit a more legitimate one) to one of
Iraqi sovereignty. After all, the UN itself has been a
target of the insurgents, and there now seems to be a
general mistrust and impatience with any foreign
control over Iraq’s future. Any proposal to stabilize
Iraq must restore a sense of ownership to the Iraqi
people as well as real power.
For these reasons, we need to think in bolder terms
about what we can offer to the international community
and to the Iraqi people in order to gain their active
support for a plan that would transfer authority to
the UN and to an Iraqi interim government. There would
need to be three elements to this grand bargain. The
first would be the promise of substantial resources to
the UN, not only for this Iraqi state-building effort
but also for comparable efforts in the future,
including resources that would increase the capacity
of the UN to provide more of its own security in the
future for such missions. Unless the United States can
demonstrate to the other major stakeholders in the UN
that its attitude toward the organization has changed,
it is unlikely to elicit more than a token response.
The second element of the grand bargain must be the
internationalization of other elements of US Middle
East policy that affect the political dynamic inside
Iraq. It makes no sense whatsoever for other countries
to commit money and security forces to Iraq as long as
the United States continues to condone Israeli policy
toward the Palestinians and pursues a hostile policy
toward Iran and Syria. At a minimum, this means a
shift in American policy toward nonbelligerence toward
Iran and Syria, a commitment to a clear timetable for
a Palestinian state and a commitment to a true
no-weapons-of-mass-destruction zone in the Middle
East, which means a commitment to confront Israel over
its possession of nuclear weapons.
The third and final element would need to be a quick
turnover of true sovereignty to the Iraqi people,
however ill prepared they may now seem for this task.
At a minimum, any interim government must have control
over its own security forces and economy. To
demonstrate that Iraqis own their own economy, we
might consider the idea proposed by Steven Clemons of
the New America Foundation, which would give every
Iraqi an ownership stake in the country’s oil wealth.
If, for example, on June 30 every Iraqi received $300
as a distribution of future profits from the nation’s
oil wealth, it might change dramatically the political
dynamics within Iraq, insuring a more peaceful
transition to full statehood.
But unless we are willing to think more boldly along
these lines, the wiser course may be for the United
States to withdraw its troops and disengage more
generally from the region, allowing the Iraqi people
to sort out their future, with the understanding that
there may be a long period of instability, but at
least the United States would not be a contributing
factor to that instability and no longer a target of
Arab anger and frustration.
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Senior fellow, World Policy Institute at the New
School University.